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The relationship between European consensus, the margin of appreciation 
and the legitimacy of the Strasbourg Court  
Nikos Vogiatzis∗ 
When determining whether a state should be granted the margin of appreciation, often the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, the Strasbourg Court or the Court) resorts to the 
method of European consensus. However, important issues remain unclarified concerning the 
relationship between the two notions, and how such relationship in linked to the legitimacy of 
the Strasbourg Court. This article firstly shows that the two notions are often, but not always, 
inter-dependent: there have been cases where the decision on the margin of appreciation points 
in a different direction than the outcome of the comparative exercise; and in further cases, 
consensus was not the crucial factor to be taken into consideration by the Strasbourg Court. 
Thus, consensus is one of the methods used by the Court in its application of the proportionality 
test, in order to decide on the scope of the margin of appreciation that the contracting parties 
enjoy. Next, the article explains why clarifying the relationship between consensus and the 
margin of appreciation will have implications for the Court’s interpretative practice once 
Protocols 15 and 16 ECHR enter into force. The multi-dimensional legitimacy of the 
Strasbourg Court is considered afterwards. The article then submits that the way European 
consensus is generally being used (i.e. as a factor which is obviously not irrelevant but also not 
always decisive for the outcome on the margin of appreciation) supports the multi-dimensional 
legitimacy of the Court. Nonetheless, it concludes by identifying inconsistency in the 
formulation of the relationship between the two notions in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, and 
encourages the Court to codify in a more coherent way that relationship. 
Keywords: European Court of Human Rights; margin of appreciation; European consensus; 
legitimacy; proportionality; Protocol 15 ECHR; Protocol 16 ECHR. 
Introduction 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, the Strasbourg Court or the Court) has been 
facing over the last years significant criticism for its allegedly activist approach to the scope of 
the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, the Convention). 
Often, such criticism centers on the tenet that the Strasbourg Court should grant states a broader 
margin of appreciation.1 The adoption of Protocol 15 ECHR partly reflects these views: a 
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 See, for example, Lord Hoffmann, ‘The universality of human rights’ (2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review 416. 
Russia has enacted legislation enabling the Russian Constitutional Court ‘to declare rulings of international bodies 
“impossible to implement”’; see Philip Leach and Alice Donald, ‘Russia defies Strasbourg: Is contagion 
spreading?’ (2015) EJIL Talk!, available at: www.ejiltalk.org/russia-defies-strasbourg-is-contagion-spreading. 
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product of laborious high-level conferences and especially the Brighton Declaration,2 when 
Protocol 15 enters into force it will amend the Convention’s preamble with a view to including 
a reference to the margin of appreciation doctrine and the principle of subsidiarity.3 More recent 
developments include the adoption of the ‘Copenhagen Declaration’ in April 2018, which 
makes several references to the subsidiarity principle, the margin of appreciation and dialogue.4 
The margin of appreciation doctrine generally entails that since the ECHR guarantees 
minimum standards of protection, the Strasbourg Court – depending of course on the 
circumstances of the case and the right in question - may leave the standard of protection of 
that human right to the respondent state. When the Court examines the breadth of the margin 
of appreciation, often it seeks to establish the existence of ‘European consensus’. European 
consensus is effectively a comparative exercise across the members of the Council of Europe 
to identify broad, but not necessarily unanimous, agreement/ convergence (or disagreement) 
on a legal issue, with a view to potentially increasing the scope of the human right in question. 
The (seemingly interrelated) concepts of consensus and the margin of appreciation have 
emerged as central to the work of the ECtHR. Simultaneously, they are politically contested; 
the adoption of Protocol 15 and the debate surrounding the Copenhagen Declaration clearly 
confirm this. But, crucially, the precise nature of their relationship has been inadequately set 
out by the Court. Indeed, much of the confusion surrounding the two terms stems from the 
Court’s own case-law, and its general reluctance not only to provide sufficiently precise 
definitions when interpreting the Convention, but also (as this article will show) to articulate 
in clear terms the relationship between key concepts, such as the one between consensus and 
the margin of appreciation. And yet whether and to what extent reliance on consensus will 
inform the Court’s outcome on the margin of appreciation is a matter directly related to the 
overall legitimacy of the Strasbourg Court. 
Moreover, the development of consensus analysis by the ECtHR has had significant 
implications for the argumentation of the parties before the Strasbourg Court. The respondent 
states are inclined to argue that the lack of consensus entails that states should be granted the 
margin of appreciation; conversely, individuals advance the claim that there is European 
 
more accommodating to the Court’s evolutive interpretation. See, for example, Judgment no 49/2015 of the Italian 
Constitutional Court, holding that the ordinary courts in Italy are bound to comply with the case-law of the 
Strasbourg Court only when it is well-settled. For a related online symposium by the I·CONnect blog see: 
www.iconnectblog.com/2015/04/mini-symposium-on-cc-judgment-49-2015/.  
2
 See, for example, Mark Elliott, ‘After Brighton: Between a rock and a hard place’ [2012] Public Law 619.  
3
 See Art 1 of Protocol 15 ECHR. Protocol 15 ECHR was adopted in June 2013.  
4
 See ‘Copenhagen Declaration’ (2018) available at: rm.coe.int/copenhagen-declaration/16807b915c. 
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consensus on a matter falling under the scope of the Convention, and therefore that the 
Strasbourg Court should not grant the respondent the margin of appreciation.  
In this context, this article rejects the presumption that the decision on the margin of 
appreciation will always depend on the identification (or not) of European consensus: this 
refers not only to cases where the outcome of the comparative exercise did not correspond to 
the Court’s decision on the margin of appreciation, but also to cases where consensus was not 
necessarily the most important factor in determining the margin of appreciation. Moreover, this 
contribution argues that the way European consensus is generally being used by the ECtHR in 
order to decide on the margin of appreciation supports the multi-dimensional5 legitimacy of 
the Strasbourg Court, which has to strike a (no doubt difficult) balance between the 
development of human rights in Europe and its role as jurisdiction of last resort, in accordance 
with the subsidiarity principle. Taking this further, it is submitted that the ECtHR should 
disentangle the majoritarian dimension of consensus from the application of the margin of 
appreciation, and elaborate more on the nature and scope of convergence across Europe in its 
jurisprudence. Lastly, the article claims that the Strasbourg Court should formulate in clearer 
terms and codify in its case-law the interplay between the two notions.  
Thus, the article makes a significant contribution to the debates on the legitimacy of the Court, 
given that, since the Court’s legitimacy is multi-dimensional, it cannot solely depend on 
consensus; and the occasional tensions between the two notions (e.g. when there is lack of 
consensus and yet the Court decides that it should not grant the respondent the margin of 
appreciation) do not, for this reason alone, suggest that the ECtHR’s legitimacy is undermined. 
By examining the implications post-Protocols 15 and 16 ECHR, the paper also contributes to 
the ongoing (as the Copenhagen Declaration aptly verifies) process of reform of the Convention 
machinery. Lastly, by clarifying the precise interplay between the two concepts, the article 
informs the debate on how the ECtHR’s reasoning can be improved. 
The argument is advanced as follows. First, some preliminary remarks are offered on the two 
concepts and their relationship. Next, the article rejects the presumption that the decision on 
the margin of appreciation will always depend on the identification (or not) of European 
consensus. Undeniably, the Strasbourg Court often follows the guidance of its Europe-wide 
comparative exercise – often, but not always. Specific categories of cases where this absence 
of dependency (in other words, cases where the doctrine of European consensus is not always 
 
5
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Accepted on 1 November 2018. Forthcoming in 25(3) European Public Law (2019) 
4 
 
used by the Court as the altera pars of the margin of appreciation) can be identified are 
explored. Taking this path of enquiry further, it is shown that European consensus is one of the 
methods used by the Court in the context of its application of the proportionality test, in order 
to decide on the scope of the margin of appreciation that the contracting parties enjoy.  
The next section explains how defining the interplay between the margin of appreciation and 
European consensus has implications which also pertain to the Court’s interpretative practice 
once Protocols 15 and 16 ECHR enter into force. The penultimate part of the article 
demonstrates how the broader approach of the Court (namely that European consensus is not 
an irrelevant factor for the outcome on the margin of appreciation, but simultaneously it is not 
always the decisive factor) supports its multi-dimensional legitimacy. Nonetheless, the Court 
has used varying formulations in its case-law to delineate the relationship between the two 
notions. On this point, the article concludes by explaining that the Strasbourg Court should be 
more coherent when articulating this relationship.  
It is appropriate at this juncture to clarify the scope of this paper. To begin with, the article 
deals with ‘the how question’, namely how consensus generally relates to the margin of 
appreciation in the jurisprudence of the Court. It is beyond its aims to elaborate on exactly 
when European consensus should be used by the Strasbourg Court (e.g. in which Convention 
rights or issues under examination). Thus, the judgments under consideration in this article 
have actually involved the use of consensus by the Court. Moreover, by emphasising that what 
is compatible with the legitimacy of the Court is the way European consensus is generally (and 
therefore not specifically, i.e. in a specific case discussed here) being used by the ECtHR in 
order to decide on the margin of appreciation, the present article does not adopt a position either 
on the overall outcome or the legitimacy of the judgments under examination.  
On the margin of appreciation, European consensus and their relationship: Conceptual 
and definitional issues 
In the well-known Handyside case, the ECtHR sought to clarify a few issues regarding the 
margin of appreciation. Firstly, the margin was linked with subsidiarity; second, the Court 
stated that the margin is granted both to the legislature and the domestic judiciary or other 
organs interpreting the law; but – third - this margin is not unlimited as it is ultimately shaped 
by European supervision.6  
 
6
 Handyside v the United Kingdom, Application 5493/72, 7 December 1976, paras 47-49. 
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As Legg observed, one of the reasons behind the use of the margin of appreciation in 
international human rights law is ‘democracy’, in that tribunals are likely to take into account 
the legislature’s weighting of competing interests or the extent of public participation.7 The 
difficulty here – and this is acknowledged by Legg – is that judicial deference in international 
adjudication can be grounded in different reasons than those emerging within a domestic 
constitutional framework. Thus, when the Strasbourg Court assesses the quality of debate 
within the domestic legislature,8 for example, it should proceed with caution, even if this may 
result in a decision to grant the respondent the margin of appreciation.9 Such level of scrutiny 
by the Strasbourg Court may be viewed as an instance of a Court exceeding its powers: one 
might wonder whether the Court was established to be involved to that degree in developments 
within the domestic democratic process. Other (perhaps pragmatic) justifications for deference 
include the extreme possibility of withdrawal from the ECHR or significant delays in the 
implementation of the ECtHR’s judgments.10 Letsas distinguished between the substantive use 
of the margin of appreciation, namely whether applicants can enjoy a certain right as a matter 
of human rights law, and the structural one, based on the idea that the Strasbourg Court is an 
international tribunal and therefore it has to defer to the contracting parties as they are better 
placed to decide on the issue that is being put before it.11 It is under this latter dimension that 
the lack of consensus among contracting states becomes primarily relevant, according to 
 
7
 Andrew Legg, The margin of appreciation in International Human Rights Law: Deference and proportionality 
(Oxford University Press 2012) ch 4. 
8
 On this point see Matthew Saul, ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ margin of appreciation and the processes 
of national parliaments’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 745. 
9
 This is not, of course, always the case. See, for example, the well-known judgment of Hirst v the United Kingdom 
(No 2), Application 74025/01, 6 October 2005, para 79: ‘As to the weight to be attached to the position adopted 
by the legislature and judiciary in the United Kingdom, there is no evidence that Parliament has ever sought to 
weigh the competing interests or to assess the proportionality of a blanket ban on the right of a convicted prisoner 
to vote.’ 
10
 Laurence Helfer, ‘Consensus, coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1993) 26 Cornell 
International Law Journal 133, at 137. Although once perceived as highly unlikely, the possibility of withdrawal 
from the ECHR is recently considered as an option within certain circles in the UK. For an insightful perspective 
on the relationship between the UK and Strasbourg see Ed Bates, ‘The UK and Strasbourg: A strained relationship 
– The long view’ in Katja Ziegler, Elizabeth Wicks and Loveday Hodson (eds), The UK and European Human 
Rights: A strained relationship? (Hart Publishing 2015) 39. 
11
 George Letsas, ‘Two concepts of the margin of appreciation’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705. 
That states are ‘better placed’ to decide is an argument also advanced by Legg’s account of grating the margin ‘on 
the basis of superior knowledge or expertise of local authorities’; Legg (n 7) ch 6. Further accounts in the 
(extensive) literature include: Eva Brems, ‘The margin of appreciation doctrine in the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (1996) 56 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 240; Paul 
Mahoney, ‘Marvellous richness of diversity or invidious cultural relativism?’ (1998) 19 Human Rights Law 
Journal 1; Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The margin of appreciation doctrine and the principle of proportionality in 
the jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia 2002); Dean Spielmann, ‘Whither the margin of appreciation?’ 67 
Current Legal Problems (2014) 49. 
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Letsas.12 More generally, it is no secret that the ECtHR’s methodology regarding the margin 
of appreciation has attracted varied criticism.13 
At this point the use of European consensus by the Court can be considered. While it is indeed 
possible to understand the term ‘consensus’ as encompassing ‘consensus based on international 
treaties, internal consensus in the respondent Contracting Party, [and] expert consensus’, only 
the identification of ‘consensus based on comparative analysis of the laws and practices of the 
Contracting Parties’ can truly be viewed as European consensus.14 On this basis, the present 
contribution refers only to the latter use of consensus by the ECtHR. Indeed, European 
consensus analysis can occupy its distinct place in the ECtHR’s reasoning only if it is 
dissociated from other interpretative practices used by the Court. To that end, European 
consensus is inevitably linked to this seemingly straightforward question: what is the position 
(or perhaps ‘the trend’15) in the broad majority of domestic legal orders? It is this 
‘supermajoritarian’ tendency (for lack of a better term) within Europe that consists the essence 
of consensus analysis and, by consequence, its distinctive contribution to the Court’s 
methodology. The Research Division of the Court undertakes the task of conducting this 
comparative exercise.16 The use of such comparative method can be explained by the fact that 
the ECHR stems from the domestic systems, and this is confirmed by the Convention’s 
Preamble, which refers to the ‘common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the 
rule of law’.17  
The consensus method can appear appealing (to some) or unattractive (to others); or perhaps it 
has the potential to be both, as this contribution will argue, thereby distinguishing itself from 
accounts severely criticizing or wholeheartedly endorsing this form of reasoning. Indeed, this 
type of comparative ‘majoritarian’ exercise may be viewed by some as acknowledgment of the 
 
12
 Letsas (n 11) 722.  
13
 See Steven Greer, The margin of appreciation: Interpretation and discretion under the European Convention 
on Human Rights (Council of Europe Publishing 2000) 32, arguing that the margin of appreciation ‘could be said 
to lack the minimum theoretical specificity and coherence which a viable legal doctrine requires’. Authors have 
also emphasised the need to duly consider minority rights; see, for example, Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Margin of 
appreciation, consensus, and universal standards’ (1999) 31 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 843, 
in particular 848-850. Compare also Carla Zoethout, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Violation and (in)Compatibility: 
Why the ECtHR Might Consider Using an Alternative Mode of Adjudication’ (2014) 20 European Public Law 
309; Jan Kratochvíl, ‘The inflation of the margin of appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 
29 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 324. 
14
 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European consensus and the legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights 
(Cambridge University Press 2015) 39. 
15
 Ibid, 12 (and case-law cited therein). 
16
 Ibid, 86-87. That Division is part of the Court’s Registry. 
17
 See Eva Brems, Human rights: Universality and diversity (Martinus Nijhoff 2001) 420. 
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Court’s position to guarantee minimum standards of protection, while by others as reluctance 
to adjudicate. Moreover, the Court’s level of consistency when relying on consensus analysis 
has been far from satisfactory.18  
But how is the use of consensus related to the margin of appreciation? Commentators accept 
that European consensus is not the only method used by the Court,19 and as ‘a factor 
determining whether a wider or narrower margin of appreciation ought to apply’ it is not 
binding.20 A properly applied consensus ‘is a criterion that determines the breadth of the margin 
of appreciation in a more objective, transparent and predictable manner than achieved through 
the application of other criteria’.21 The comparative advantage of consensus, according to that 
author, is that it enhances the legitimacy of the Court’s decisions. Because of this link with 
legitimacy, Dzehtsiarou grants consensus some type of primacy over other methods used by 
the Court in such cases. Thus, in the same contribution he argues: 
‘European consensus can be conceptualized as a way of mediating between the margin 
of appreciation and evolutive interpretation. If there is no European consensus, the issue 
will fall in the area of the margin of appreciation, and as soon as consensus is established, 
the ECtHR can apply evolutive interpretation and wrest this issue from state discretion.’22 
 
18
 See, for example, S.H. and Others v Austria, Application 57813/00, 3 November 2011. Therein, the Court firstly 
observed that ‘there is now a clear trend in the legislation of the Contracting States towards allowing gamete 
donation for the purpose of in vitro fertilisation, which reflects an emerging European consensus’, before adding 
that ‘[t]hat emerging consensus is not, however, based on settled and long-standing principles established in the 
law of the member States but rather reflects a stage of development within a particularly dynamic field of law and 
does not decisively narrow the margin of appreciation of the State’ (para 96). However, the Court on several 
occasions has been satisfied with the emergence of a clear trend across Europe. See also the dissenting opinion of 
seven Judges in Odièvre v France, Application 42326/98, 13 February 2003, para 12: ‘the suggestion that the 
States had to be afforded a margin of appreciation owing to the absence of a common denominator between their 
domestic laws simply does not tally with the extracts of comparative law on which the Court itself relies’.  
19
 Petkova argues that ‘the ECtHR analyses consensus to establish a dialogue with representatives of its larger 
constituency and has thus never interpreted it as a stand-alone judicial test on which to exclusively base its 
decisions’; see Bilyana Petkova, ‘The notion of consensus as a route to democratic adjudication?’ (2012) 14 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 663, at 681-682. 
20
 Luzius Wildhaber, Arnaldur Hjartarson and Stephen Donnely, ‘No consensus on consensus? The practice of 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 33 Human Rights Law Journal 248, at 249, 262 (emphasis added).  
21
 Dzehtsiarou (n 14) 132-133. 
22
 Ibid, 138. See also Arai-Takahashi (n 11) 203-204, who views European consensus as a ‘bridge’ between 
evolutive interpretation and the margin of appreciation. On the link between consensus and evolutive 
interpretation see also the seminal judgment Tyrer v the United Kingdom, Application 5856/72, 25 April 1978, 
para 31; and, conversely, Vo v France, Application 53924/00, 8 July 2004, para 82, granting France the margin 
of appreciation in the absence of European consensus ‘notwithstanding an evolutive interpretation of the 
Convention’. Further on the notion of evolutive interpretation see, among others, Dialogue between judges 2011: 
‘What are the limits to the evolutive interpretation of the Convention?’ (Council of Europe 2011). The evolutive 
interpretation is based on the tenet that the Convention is a living instrument; see, for example, Sir Nicolas Bratza, 
‘Living instrument or dead letter: the future of the European Convention on Human Rights’ [2014] European 
Human Rights Law Review 116. For Bjorge, the evolutionary interpretation of the treaties ‘represent[s] an 
intended evolution’; Eirik Bjorge, The evolutionary interpretation of the treaties (Oxford University Press 2014). 
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To be sure, Dzehtsiarou accepts that consensus is a ‘rebuttable presumption’; or that its nature/ 
application is ‘non-absolute and non-automatic’.23 
In a concurring opinion Judge Rozakis argued: 
‘[I]t is my opinion that the mere absence of a wide consensus among European States 
concerning the taking of photographs of charged or convicted persons in connection with 
court proceedings does not suffice to justify the application of the margin of appreciation. 
This ground is only a subordinate basis for the application of the concept, if and when 
the Court first finds that the national authorities are better placed than the Strasbourg 
Court to deal effectively with the matter. If the Court so finds, the next step would be to 
ascertain whether the presence or absence of a common approach of European States to 
a matter sub judice does or does not allow the application of the concept.’24 
Writing extra-judicially, he claimed elsewhere that ‘the time has come where this Court should 
disentangle the “consensus” factor from the application of the margin of appreciation’.25 
Explaining this position, he observed that ‘even in situations where there is no consensus, the 
Court is free to undertake its own assessment of the facts and produce its own reasoning – not 
necessarily leading to a violation – which, after all, may be of assistance to European states’ 
whenever they may have to adjudicate on a similar situation.26 For Wildhaber and colleagues, 
‘consensus informs the content of the treaty obligations contained in the ECHR’.27 Thus, 
consensus ‘is a factor or element in defining the margin of appreciation, in proportionality 
balancing and generally in interpreting the ECHR, of indicative, persuasive, in some cases 
probably decisive value’.28 
How the Court itself has attempted to delineate in its case-law the relationship between 
consensus analysis and the margin of appreciation will be critically examined in the last section 
of the paper. In order to take this path of enquiry further, though, it is possible to think of a 
number of scenarios with regard to the link between the two doctrines. First, the Court identifies 
 
Compare also Christian Djeffal, Static and evolutive treaty interpretation: A functional reconstruction 
(Cambridge University Press 2015), in particular chapter 10. 
23
 Dzehtsiarou (n 14) 37, 206. 
24
 Concurring Opinion of Judge Rozakis in Egeland and Hanseid v Norway, Application 34438/04, 16 April 2009 
(emphasis original). 
25
 Christos Rozakis, ‘Through the looking glass: An “insider’s” view on the margin of appreciation’, in La 
conscience des droits: Mélanges en l’honneur de Jean-Paul Costa (Dalloz 2011) 527, at 536. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Wildhaber et al (n 20) 256. 
28
 Ibid. 
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European consensus (existing or growing/emerging) in a direction different from that of the 
domestic legislation or practice in question, and then narrows the margin of appreciation of the 
state; this is a fairly common application of European consensus.29 Second, conversely, the 
Court finds lack of European consensus and grants the respondent the margin of appreciation.30 
Both scenarios effectively align with the widely shared practice of respondent states or 
applicants to argue that the identification or not of European consensus should determine the 
Court’s decision on the margin of appreciation. Third, there have been instances where the 
Court, despite identifying the existence of (almost) pan-European agreement on a particular 
issue, contrary to the practice and/or legislation of the respondent, it decided, nonetheless, to 
grant the respondent the margin of appreciation. This leads to the fourth (and inverse) scenario, 
namely cases where, despite the lack of European consensus, the ECtHR did not grant the 
respondent the margin of appreciation. The focus of the article will now shift to the third and 
fourth categories, for they can provide us with further insights into the interplay between the 
two terms. In all of the cases discussed in the following two sections, European consensus was 
not the catalyst in determining the Court’s position on the margin of appreciation.  
Cases where the Strasbourg Court was deferential despite the presence of European 
consensus 
In the Chamber Sitaropoulos judgment, the Court dealt with the question as to whether Greece 
did not meet its obligations under Article 3 of Protocol 1 when failing to implement legislation 
with a view to securing expatriates’ right to vote.31 The Court relied considerably on the fact 
that Greece ‘clearly [fell] short of the common denominator among Contracting States as 
regards the effective exercise of voting rights by expatriates’; moreover, the Convention should 
guarantee rights that are practical and effective.32 Thus, Greece could not rely on the otherwise 
wide margin of appreciation that the Strasbourg Court generally tends to grant states under 
Article 3 of Protocol 1. Despite the above, the Grand Chamber, while acknowledging that the 
‘great majority’ of states had implemented legislation enabling citizens to vote from abroad, it 
nonetheless found that their arrangements and criteria for this right differed.33 The Grand 
Chamber also took into account the fact that several international human rights treaties (and 
 
29
 For example, the Court has decided that the lack of legal recognition of same-sex couples goes against the 
state’s positive obligations under Article 8 ECHR; Oliari and Others v Italy, Applications 18766/11 and 36030/11, 
21 October 2015.  
30
 See, for example, Lautsi and Others v Italy, Application 30814/06, 18 March 2011.  
31
 Sitaropoulos and Others v Greece, Application 42202/07, 8 July 2010. 
32
 Ibid, paras 44-47. 
33
 Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v Greece, Application 42207/07, 15 March 2012 (Grand Chamber), para 74. 
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their interpretation by international tribunals) did not provide for such right, and furthermore 
observed that instruments adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly and the Venice Commission 
simply invited, without obliging, states to consider extending the right to vote for expatriates.34 
Thus, the Grand Chamber held that ‘none of the legal instruments examined above forms a 
basis for concluding that, as the law currently stands, States are under an obligation to enable 
citizens living abroad to exercise the right to vote’.35 The Grand Chamber appeared to conflate 
the question as to whether, in principle, nationals living abroad have the right to vote (on which 
it did underline the emergence of European consensus) with the question as to how such right 
should be guaranteed, on which it identified ‘a wide variety of approaches’36 (and therefore 
absence of consensus). 
Turning to Article 8 ECHR, in A, B and C v Ireland the Court dealt with the prohibition of 
abortion in Ireland.37 The three applicants had travelled to England for abortion for reasons 
related to their health and well-being (the two first applicants) or fear that pregnancy was a risk 
to their lives (the third applicant). They submitted that the restrictions on lawful abortion in 
Ireland constituted a violation of their right to private life. To substantiate their claim, they 
relied, among others, on the clear ‘European consensus’ pointing to the extension of the right 
to abortion in Ireland.38 The Court found that ‘contrary to the Government’s submission, … 
there [was] indeed a consensus amongst a substantial majority of the Contracting States … 
towards allowing abortion on broader grounds than accorded under Irish law’.39 Nonetheless, 
that was not sufficient for the Strasbourg Court in order for Ireland’s margin of appreciation to 
be restricted.40 In that case, the Court relied on the fair balance between the protection of public 
interest (framed as ‘the acute sensitivity of the moral and ethical issues raised by the question 
of abortion’) and the need to respect the applicants’ right to private life under Article 8 ECHR.41 
Methodologically questionable was the Court’s reference to the lack of consensus as to when 
life begins, for the purposes of Article 2 ECHR42 – although there is an obvious connection, 
the ECtHR in A, B, and C v Ireland examined the prohibition of abortion in light of Article 8, 
 
34
 Ibid, paras 72-73. 
35
 Ibid, paras 74-75. 
36
 Ibid, para 75. 
37
 A, B and C v Ireland, Application 25579/05, 16 December 2010. 
38
 Ibid, paras 174-175.  
39
 Ibid, para 235. 
40
 Ibid, para 236. 
41
 Ibid, paras 232-233 and  
42
 With reference to the aforementioned case Vo v France (n 22) paras 75-80. 
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not 2, ECHR.43 In any event, crucial in the Court’s conclusion on the margin of appreciation 
was perhaps the aforementioned fair balance test, re-formulated later in the judgment by the 
Court as the need to examine ‘whether the interference constitute[d] a proportionate balancing 
of the competing interests involved’.44 In that case, despite the presence of European consensus 
pointing in a different direction, the Strasbourg Court gave weight to ‘the profound moral views 
of the Irish people as to the nature of life’.45 The Court refused to acknowledge (as requested 
by the applicants) that the views of the Irish people had changed significantly since the 1983 
referendum46 – the result of the recent referendum of May 201847 evidently demonstrates that 
the Court’s analysis of the legitimate aim in that case was rather shallow. 
Elsewhere, the Court had to decide whether a ban on ‘secondary action’, namely strike action 
in support of the initial – lawful – strike, is compatible with Article 11 ECHR.48 In order to 
determine whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society, the ECtHR took into 
account – among others - comparative studies by the European Committee on Social Rights, 
demonstrating that ‘with its outright ban on secondary action the [UK stood] at one end of the 
comparative spectrum, being one of a small group of European States to adopt such a 
categorical stance on the matter’.49 Looking at the international level, the ECtHR furthermore 
added that the UK was ‘out of line with a discernible international trend calling for a less 
restrictive approach’.50 Interestingly, the Strasbourg Court underlined that the UK government 
‘played down the significance of the comparative perspective, emphasising the deep structural 
and cultural differences among European States in the field of industrial relations’.51 
Eventually, the Court decided to grant the UK the margin of appreciation, prioritising a number 
of other considerations: the need to strike a fair balance between ‘the competing interests of 
the individual and of the community as a whole’;52 that the interference in the exercise of the 
applicant’s trade-union freedom was not as ‘invasive’ as the applicant had argued, given that 
 
43
 The explanation offered by the Court was that since ‘the rights claimed on behalf of the foetus and those of the 
mother are inextricably interconnected … the margin of appreciation accorded to a State’s protection of the unborn 
necessarily translates into a margin of appreciation for that State as to how it balances the conflicting rights of the 
mother’; A, B and C v Ireland (n 37) para 237. 
44
 Ibid, para 238. 
45
 Ibid, para 241. 
46
 Ibid, paras 223-228.  
47
 See: www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/26/ireland-votes-by-landslide-to-legalise-abortion. 
48
 National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) v the United Kingdom, Application 31045/10, 
8 April 2014. 
49
 Ibid, para 91. 
50
 Ibid, para 98. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Ibid, para 86. 
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‘the effect of the ban on secondary action [did not strike] at the very substance of the applicant 
union’s freedom of association’ under Article 11 ECHR, which meant that a wider margin of 
appreciation had to be granted to the respondent state;53 that in the sphere of social and 
economic policy ‘the Court will generally respect the legislature’s policy choice unless it is 
“manifestly without reasonable foundation”’;54 and also that there was a domestic consensus 
on the scope of permissible industrial action.55 On this basis, the Court ultimately found that 
the UK had not violated Article 11 ECHR. 
Cases where the Strasbourg Court was not deferential despite the lack of European 
consensus 
In Goodwin, the Court found a violation of Article 8 ECHR, due to the lack of legal recognition 
in the United Kingdom of gender reassignment.56 The Court took into account the ‘continuing 
international trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal 
recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals’,57 and attached less 
importance to the missing common European approach to the matter. The ECtHR underlined 
that ‘the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of 
[the] guarantees’ under Article 8 ECHR,58 and also that ‘serious interference with private life 
can arise where the state of domestic law conflicts with an important aspect of personal 
identity’.59 On the basis of the fair balance test, the Strasbourg Court concluded that ‘there 
[were] no significant factors of public interest to weigh against the interest of this individual 
applicant in obtaining legal recognition of her gender reassignment’, and therefore the 
respondent state could ‘no longer claim that the matter [fell] within their margin of 
appreciation, save as regards the appropriate means of achieving recognition of the right [to 
private life] protected under the Convention.’60 Moreover, the Court found a violation of the 
right to marry under Article 12 ECHR. The Court inferred from comparative material submitted 
to it that ‘fewer countries permit[ted] the marriage of transsexuals in their assigned gender than 
recognise[d] the change of gender itself’.61 Still, the ECtHR pointed out that the margin of 
appreciation could not ‘extend so far’ as to find that ‘the range of options open to a Contracting 
 
53
 Ibid, para 88. 
54
 Ibid, para 99. 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Goodwin v the United Kingdom, Application 28957/95, 11 July 2002. 
57
 Ibid, para 85. 
58
 Ibid, para 90. 
59
 Ibid, para 77. 
60
 Ibid, paras 91-93. 
61
 Ibid, para 103. 
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State included an effective bar on any exercise of the right to marry’; the ‘very essence’ of the 
applicant’s right to marry had been infringed.62 
In the case of Hirst (No 2), the Strasbourg Court had to adjudicate on the compatibility of the 
ban on prisoners’ right to vote with the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol 1 ECHR.63 The 
UK essentially argued that the lack of European consensus on the matter (a point accepted by 
the Court64) entailed that it should be granted the margin of appreciation. Nonetheless, the 
outcome of the comparative exercise was not sufficient for the Court to conclude that the 
restriction in question was proportionate. Among others, the ECtHR underlined the lack of 
sufficient debate within the UK parliament (discussed above); the point that ‘even if no 
common European approach to the problem can be discerned, this cannot in itself be 
determinative of the issue’ as the wide margin of appreciation under the abovementioned 
Convention article is not ‘all embracing’;65 and that this was a ‘blanket restriction on all 
convicted prisoners in prison’, which did not take into account the individual circumstances of 
the prisoners, the nature of the office, the length of service, etc.66 The Court also added that 
this was a ‘vitally important Convention right’, having previously observed that the right to 
vote in the twenty first century should not be considered as a ‘privilege’.67 Importantly, the 
Court left it to the UK ‘legislature to decide on the choice of means for securing the rights 
guaranteed’ by Article 3 of Protocol 1.68 
In Dickson, the Court found a violation of Article 8 in the absence of European consensus, 
given that the UK policy at stake (the refusal of artificial insemination facilities to prisoners, 
except for exceptional circumstances) ‘effectively excluded any real weighing of the competing 
individual and public interests, and prevented the required assessment of the proportionality of 
a restriction, in any individual case’.69 That was so because the policy at stake ‘placed an 
inordinately high “exceptionality” burden on the applicants when requesting artificial 
insemination facilities’.70 Thus, relying on the fair balance test, the Court concluded that as the 
 
62
 Ibid, paras 101, 103. 
63
 Hirst v the United Kingdom (No 2) (n 9).  
64
 Ibid, para 81: ‘As regards the existence or not of any consensus among Contracting States, the Court notes that, 
although there is some disagreement about the legal position in certain States, it is undisputed that the United 
Kingdom is not alone among Convention countries in depriving all convicted prisoners of the right to vote. It may 
also be said that the law in the United Kingdom is less far-reaching than in certain other States.’ 
65
 Ibid, paras 81-82. 
66
 Ibid, para 82. 
67
 Ibid, paras 59, 82. 
68
 Ibid, para 84. 
69
 Dickson v the United Kingdom, Application 44362/04, 4 December 2007, para 82. 
70
 Ibid. 
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threshold was already too high for applicants, it precluded an individual assessment and 
balancing of the competing public and individual interests on the basis of proportionality.71 
The Court accordingly noted that ‘the matter was of vital importance to the applicants’ as 
artificial insemination was their only realistic hope of having a child together.72 Overall, the 
policy in question violated Article 8 ECHR and fell outside the scope of the UK’s margin of 
appreciation. 
In Phinikaridou, the statutory three-year limitation period prevented subsequent requests for 
judicial recognition of paternity, even when applicants became aware of circumstances that 
would enable them to seek judicial recognition after the expiration of that period.73 The Court 
firstly observed that ‘the existence of a limitation period per se is not incompatible with the 
Convention’.74 The pertinent question was, however, whether the absoluteness of such period 
satisfied the fair balance test. Although the Court did not use the term ‘consensus’, it was 
probably of the view that such consensus was absent. In particular, the ECtHR observed that a 
‘comparative examination of the Contracting States’ legislation on the institution of actions for 
judicial recognition of paternity reveal[ed] that there [was] no uniform approach in this field’; 
yet ‘a tendency [could] be ascertained towards a greater protection of the right of the child to 
have its paternal affiliation established’.75 Still, the length of existing time limits (if established) 
varied considerably (between one and thirty years) and, crucially, ‘[o]nly a small number of 
legal systems seem[ed] to have produced solutions to the problem which arises when the 
relevant circumstances become known only after the expiry of the time-limit’.76 The Strasbourg 
Court nonetheless paid particular attention to the essence of the right in question when 
performing the balancing exercise. It reiterated that the Convention guarantees rights that are 
not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective, and that by disproportionately protecting 
the general interest (‘legal certainty in family relations’) and that of the presumed father, the 
respondent proceeded to a ‘radical restriction’ of the applicant’s ‘right to find out her origins’.77 
Thus, despite the considerable margin of appreciation that is generally left to states on this 
 
71
 Ibid, paras 82-83. 
72
 Ibid, paras 72, 87. 
73
 Phinikaridou v Cyprus, Application 23890/02, 20 December 2007. 
74
 Ibid, para 52. 
75
 Ibid, para 58. 
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 Ibid, para 59. 
77
 Ibid, para 64. 
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matter, under these circumstances ‘the very essence of the right to respect for one’s private life 
under Article 8’ had been impaired.78 
In X and Others v Austria, the Court examined whether the prohibition of the adoption of the 
child of one partner in a same-sex couple by the other partner was compatible with Article 14, 
in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR.79 The Court underlined the difference in treatment of the 
applicants when compared to unmarried heterosexual couples in respect of second-parent 
adoption. Turning to its proportionality analysis, it pointed out that where there is a difference 
in treatment based on sex or sexual orientation the margin of appreciation is narrow, and 
therefore proportionality ‘does not merely require the measure chosen to be suitable in principle 
for achievement of the aim sought’ but it must also be demonstrated that it was ‘necessary … 
to exclude certain categories of people, in this instance persons living together in a homosexual 
relationship, from the scope of application of the provisions in issue’.80 No such argument or 
evidence was provided by the Government. The respondent did, however, advance the lack of 
European consensus on the issue of second-parent adoption by same-sex couples. The Court 
firstly reiterated the narrow margin of appreciation when it comes to issues of discrimination 
on the grounds of sex or sexual orientation.81 It then explained that the key issue in the present 
case was the difference in treatment and not generally the question of same-sex couples’ access 
to second-parent adoption.82 Thus, only the ten Council of Europe states that allowed ‘second-
parent adoption in unmarried couples may be regarded as a basis for comparison’, and ‘the 
narrowness of this sample [was] such that no conclusions can be drawn as to the existence of 
a possible consensus’.83 The Court concluded that the difference in treatment could not be 
justified and there was a violation of Article 14, in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR. 
The margin of appreciation does not always depend on European consensus  
These two categories of cases aptly illustrate that the assessment on the margin of appreciation 
does not always depend on European consensus. Whether one agrees or disagrees with how 
the ECtHR conducted its balancing exercise and/or with its conclusion in some (or all) of the 
 
78
 Ibid, para 65. In a more recent case, with a factual and legal framework different from that in Phinikaridou, the 
Court clarified that if applicants show ‘an unjustifiable lack of diligence in instituting paternity proceedings’, 
while being aware of their respective father’s identity, the margin of appreciation granted to states regarding such 
proceedings would mean that the legislation in question would be compatible with Article 8. See Silva and 
Mondim Correia v Portugal, Applications 72105/14 and 20415/15, 3 October 2017, in particular paras 67-70. 
79
 X and Others v Austria, Application 19010/07, 19 February 2013. 
80
 Ibid, para 140. 
81
 Ibid, para 148. 
82
 Ibid, para 149. 
83
 Ibid. 
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above cases are separate matters: this contribution is concerned with providing insights into 
the Court’s general (and therefore not specific) approach with regard to the link between 
consensus and the margin of appreciation. And the latter is explainable, it will be argued, if 
that general approach is linked with the question of its legitimacy. Such discussion can only 
take place once the function of consensus within the Court’s reasoning has been fully 
crystallised – which is the purpose of the following paragraphs. 
It must be said that cases like those presented in the earlier two sections are not the norm in the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court: often, the comparative exercise corresponds to the 
decision on the margin of appreciation. But even when the consensus analysis is more aligned 
with (or was perhaps more influential in) the outcome on the margin of appreciation, this does 
not mean that consensus was the only, or even the determinative, factor in all of these 
judgments. In several cases that will be cited below (when consensus is viewed as part of the 
ECtHR’s proportionality exercise), a plethora of considerations, in addition to consensus, were 
taken into account by the Court before deciding on whether states should be granted the margin 
of appreciation.84 This is not to suggest, either, that there haven’t been instances where the 
Court indeed appears to place considerable emphasis on the comparative law material.85  
To further demonstrate the point made in this section, cases where the consensus argument is 
raised by one (or both) of the parties, but the ECtHR appears to omit addressing it in its 
reasoning, can also be considered.86 To be sure, other reasons behind the Court’s unwillingness 
to engage with consensus analysis may exist, including the limited available resources for such 
 
84
 For example, in Perinçek v Switzerland (Application 27510/08, 15 October 2015), the ECtHR explicitly 
acknowledged that ‘the comparative law position [could not] play a weighty part in the Court’s conclusion’, since 
‘there [were] other factors which [had] a significant bearing on the breadth of the applicable margin of 
appreciation’ (paras 256-257). The case concerned the compatibility with Article 10 ECHR of the applicant’s 
criminal conviction and punishment for having publicly denied the Armenian genocide; it concluded that there 
had been a violation of the above Article. 
85
 On the presence of consensus see, for example, S. and Marper v the United Kingdom, Applications 30562/04 
and 30566/04, 4 December 2008, in particular para 112 (against the permanent retention of DNA profiles of 
suspected but unconvicted persons); Berkovich and Others v Russia, Applications 5871/07 and 9 others, 27 March 
2018, in particular para 98 (against the prohibition of persons aware of State secrets from travelling abroad). On 
the lack of consensus see, for example: X, Y and Z v the United Kingdom, Application 21830/93, 22 April 1997, 
in particular paras 44, 52 (legal recognition of a female to male transgender person as the father of his child); 
Petrovic v Austria, Application 20458/92, 27 March 1998, in particular paras 38-43 (granting fathers parental 
leave allowance); Evans v the United Kingdom, Application 6339/05, 10 April 2007, in particular paras 79, 90 
and 92 (withdrawal of consent to the use of genetic material in the context of IVF treatment); Khamtokhu and 
Aksenchik v Russia, Applications 60367/08 and 961/11, 24 January 2017, in particular paras 83-88 (difference in 
treatment on account of age and sex with regard to life imprisonment). 
86
 See, for example, Pretty v the United Kingdom, Application 2346/02, 29 April 2002 (ban on assisted suicide); 
Delfi AS v Estonia, Application 64569/09, 16 June 2015 (liability of an online news portal for offensive 
comments); Sekmadienis Ltd. v Lithuania, Application 69317/14, 30 January 2018 (religious symbols in 
commercial advertising). 
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comparative assessment,87 or perhaps the lack of sufficient delineation of the issue on which 
consensus is being claimed for. Indeed, the consensus argument is occasionally raised almost 
mechanically by the parties concerned, without provision of any evidence (this might also 
apply to instances where the Court does, indeed, choose to take into account the comparative 
material). Since the question as to when the Court should rely on consensus is not addressed in 
this contribution, the earlier remarks should not be viewed as suggesting that the Court should 
either disregard or always be responsive to such claims. Rather, they should be viewed as 
providing further support for the claim that the margin of appreciation does not always depend 
on European consensus. Moreover, they evidence the extent to which consensus, for better or 
worse, is being viewed by parties as the catalyst for the margin of appreciation. 
European consensus as part of proportionality 
Taking this path of enquiry further, it will be shown that European consensus is one of the 
factors considered by the Court in its application of the proportionality test. Brems captured 
this in her seminal article when observing that in ‘most cases … comparative analysis is a – 
supportive or decisive – argument in the key part of the Court’s reasoning, namely where it 
measures the proportionality or the reasonableness of an interference with a protected right’.88 
The proportionality principle and the margin of appreciation doctrine are, of course, generally 
associated:89 as observed by Arai-Takahashi, ‘[t]he more intense the standard of proportionality 
becomes, the narrower the margin allowed to national authorities’, and therefore ‘[i]t is possible 
to consider the application of the proportionality principle as the other side of the margin of 
appreciation’.90 In this section it will be argued that precisely locating consensus within the 
proportionality part of the Court’s reasoning is a challenging exercise. 
 
87
 Wildhaber et al (n 20) 256-257. As the authors point out, the Court may sometimes conveniently rely on research 
that has been undertaken by the Council of Europe, UN bodies, NGOs – among others. 
88
 Brems (n 11) 277. 
89
 This is not to suggest that methodological difficulties have not been identified. Thus, it has been suggested that 
the ‘interaction between proportionality and the margin of appreciation’ remains unclear; see Jonas Christoffersen, 
Fair balance: proportionality, subsidiarity and primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2009) 31. 
90
 Arai-Takahashi (n 11) 14. 
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Indeed, it has rightly been observed that the Strasbourg Court has not adopted a particular 
structure91 when applying the proportionality test.92 To be fair to the Court, this is anything but 
an easy task, and the design of proportionality may indeed depend on the right in question or 
the facts of the case and the available evidence. For example, although the Court is frequently 
stressing that the balancing exercise will not differ on the basis of whether there is an 
interference with the right in question or a positive obligation,93 in practice the structure of the 
Court’s reasoning in the aforementioned situations can be different. Further, when Article 14 
is engaged, the ECtHR often reformulates the test, stating that ‘a difference of treatment is 
discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification; in other words, if it does not 
pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between 
the means employed and the aim sought to be realised’.94  
In this context, it is probably unwise to provide generalised conclusions as to where precisely 
the ECtHR’s consensus analysis within the application of the proportionality principle can be 
located. Despite these challenges, it can nonetheless be observed that in many cases such 
analysis is taken into account by the Court when examining whether the restriction was 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ (or a similar formulation),95 the ‘central step’ of the test to 
 
91
 Proportionality is often perceived to consist of a three-step test: whether the measure is suitable to the pursued 
objective; necessary, in the sense that less restrictive alternatives are not available; and proportionate stricto sensu, 
namely that a proper balance between the individual and public interest has been achieved. See Arai-Takahashi 
(n 11) 192-193; Christoffersen (n 89) 69-70; Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality balancing and 
global constitutionalism’ (2008-2009) 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 72, at 75-76. For a broader 
discussion on whether proportionality is suitable for human rights adjudication see, among others, Alison Young, 
‘Proportionality is dead: Long live proportionality!’ in Grant Huscroft, Bradley Miller and Grégoire Webber (eds) 
Proportionality and the rule of law: Rights, justification, reasoning (Cambridge University Press 2014) 43. 
92
 Arai-Takahashi (n 11) 193-195; Christofeferssen (n 89) 31; Eva Brems and Laurens Lavrysen, ‘“Don’t Use a 
Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut”: Less Restrictive Means in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 139. 
93
 See, for example, Odièvre v France (n 18) para 40: ‘The boundaries between the State’s positive and negative 
obligations under Article 8 do not lend themselves to precise definition. The applicable principles are nonetheless 
similar. In particular, in both instances regard must be had to the fair balance which has to be struck between the 
competing interests; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation’. Similarly, 
Phinikaridou v Cyprus (n 73) para 47; Dickson v the United Kingdom (n 69) paras 70-71. 
94
 Vallianatos and Others v Greece, Applications 29381/09 and 32684/09, 7 November 2013, para 76. The Court 
reiterated that ‘just like differences based on sex, differences based on sexual orientation require “particularly 
convincing and weighty reasons” by way of justification’ (para 77). See also Ünal Tekeli v Turkey, Application 
29865/96, 16 November 2004, paras 50-53 – among others. Moreover, the Court has clarified that ‘no difference 
in treatment which is based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person’s ethnic origin is capable of being 
objectively justified in a contemporary democratic society’; see the seminal judgment D.H. and Others v Czech 
Republic, Application 57325/00, 13 November 2007, para 176. 
95
 See, for example: A, B and C v Ireland (n 37) paras 235-236; Bayev and Others v Russia, Applications 67667/09 
and 2 others, 20 June 2017, para 66; Berkovich and Others v Russia, Applications 5871/07 and 9 others, 27 March 
2018, para 98; Chapman v the United Kingdom, Application 27238/95, 18 January 2001, paras 90-94; Demir and 
Baykara v Turkey, Application 34503/97, 12 November 2008, para 122; Dudgeon v the United Kingdom, 
Application 7525/76, 22 October 1981, para 60; Egeland and Hanseid v Norway (n 24) para 54; Hamidović v 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Application no. 57792/15, 5 December 2017, paras 36-38; Lee v the United Kingdom, 
Application 25289/94, 18 January 2001, paras 95-96; Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy, Application 25358/12, 24 
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find (or not) a violation of the Convention, and that on which the ECtHR generally devotes a 
substantial part of its reasoning.96 In cases engaging states’ positive obligations (or in certain 
instances where the Court did not deem it necessary to decide whether there was an interference 
or positive obligation) consensus has been considered (but not necessarily followed) either 
before97 or in the context of98 the ‘fair balance’ test.99 When Article 14 ECHR is engaged, 
consensus is frequently taken into account when the Court examines whether there is an 
objective and reasonable justification in the difference of treatment.100  
There is a crucial exception to the use of consensus in the context of proportionality. The Court 
may (infrequently) deploy consensus to examine whether the matter falls in the first instance 
under the scope of a Convention right. Many such cases have concerned Article 3 ECHR,101 
which is an absolute right; however, consensus has been used to delineate the scope of further 
Convention rights, such as Articles 4(3)(a),102 6,103 9,104 and 10105 ECHR. Such cases 
effectively illustrate that in the complex and often dynamic jurisprudence of the ECHR, it is 
 
January 2017, para 203; Parrillo v Italy, Application 46470/11, 27 August 2015, para 176; Perinçek v Switzerland 
(n 84) paras 255-257; (RMT) v the United Kingdom (n 48) para 98; S. and Marper v the United Kingdom (n 85), 
para 112; S.A.S. v France, Application 43835/11, 1 July 2014, para 156; S.H. and Others v Austria (n 18) paras 
95-96; Tănase v Moldova, Application 7/08, 27 April 2010, para 172. 
96
 Alain Zysset, ‘Searching for the legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights: The neglected role of 
“democratic society”’ (2016) 5 Global Constitutionalism 16, at 23. The Court has time and again stated that 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ means that ‘the interference complained of corresponded to a “pressing social 
need”, that the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it were relevant and sufficient and that it was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’; see (RMT) v the United Kingdom (n 48) para 83; Egeland and 
Hanseid v Norway (n 24) para 48 – among others. 
97
 Goodwin v the United Kingdom (n 56) paras 84-85; Hämäläinen v Finland, Application 37359/09, 16 July 
2014, paras 72-75. 
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 Dickson v the United Kingdom (n 69) paras 77-82; Evans v the United Kingdom (n 85) paras 90-92; Odièvre v 
France (n 18) para 47; Oliari and Others v Italy (n 29) para 178; Phinikaridou v Cyprus (n 73) paras 58-59; X, Y 
and Z v the United Kingdom (n 85) para 52. 
99
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in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 10 Human Rights Law Review 289, at 315. 
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 See, for example: Ünal Tekeli v Turkey (n 94) para 61; Rasmussen v Denmark, Application 8777/79, 28 
November 1984, para 41; Fretté v France, Application 36515/97, 26 February 2002, para 41; Khamtokhu and 
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not always straightforward to draw a clear line between interpretation (presumably focusing on 
the scope of the right) and balancing,106 including when consensus is being deployed by the 
Strasbourg Court. 
It is also noteworthy that generally the Court’s consensus analysis is not particularly extensive, 
even when it is more decisive for the margin of appreciation. The Court admittedly does not 
want to give the impression that the comparative exercise is the sole or main criterion upon 
which its judgment is based. Thus, the evolution in the respective human rights standards will 
be supported but not based exclusively on consensus. Conversely, such disentanglement of 
consensus from the margin of appreciation may enable the Court to show sensitivity and 
eventually accommodate ‘cultural relativist claims’.107 As Brems rightly cautions, however, 
while one of the functions of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation is indeed to take into 
account such differences, the comparative method in Europe ‘can be useful to avoid one of the 
main risks of a cultural relativist approach: its conservative tendency’.108 
The relationship between European consensus and the margin of appreciation post-
Protocols 15 and 16 ECHR 
Protocols 15 and 16 ECHR will bring to the fore the interplay between consensus and the 
margin of appreciation, pushing the Court to delineate and articulate in a clearer way in its 
reasoning the relationship between the two terms (this point is returned to toward the end of 
the article). It is remembered that much of the discussion surrounding the adoption of these two 
Protocols centred on the Court’s legitimacy, and the need (at least in the view of some 
contracting states) for the Court to further accommodate domestic sensitivities. 
When Protocol 15 enters into force,109 the Preamble of the Convention will be amended, with 
a view to including a reference to the margin of appreciation and the subsidiarity principle.110 
With regard to the former term, it can be anticipated that post-Protocol 15 some contracting 
parties will argue, first, that their margin of appreciation should be expanded – an argument 
not supported by the final text of Article 1 of Protocol 15111 – and, second, that the Protocol 
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 See Djeffal (n 22) chapter 10. 
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 On which see Brems (n 11) 285-286. 
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 Ibid, 311. 
109
 As of May 2018, all the contracting parties have signed, while 4 of them have not ratified, that Protocol; see: 
www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/213/signatures?p_auth=SeaQ9ErP 
110
 Art 1 of Protocol 15 ECHR. 
111
 On how the new Preamble might be interpreted see Nikos Vogiatzis, ‘When “reform” meets “judicial restraint”: 
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provides further support in favour of granting the margin of appreciation in the absence of 
European consensus. Another feature of Protocol 15 ECHR is the reference to the principle of 
subsidiarity.112 Subsidiarity could play a role concerning when European consensus will be 
relied upon by the Strasbourg Court. Thus, it has been argued that if one distinguishes between 
consensus (as being something ‘more than a simple majority’ of states but rather ‘express[ing] 
the general agreement’ of states) and a trend, in the latter case ‘the Court should respect the 
subsidiarity of the Strasbourg system, should wait for further consolidation and corroboration 
and, when this has taken place, only then proceed to find a “consensus”’.113 It remains to be 
seen whether and to what extent the subsidiarity principle may be used by the ECtHR in 
conjunction with European consensus or, indeed, the margin of appreciation, after Protocol 15 
enters into force.  
With the ratification by France in April 2018, Protocol 16 ECHR will enter into force on 1 
August 2018, solely in respect of the ten states which have ratified it.114 It will empower the 
highest domestic courts and tribunals to submit a question to the ECtHR concerning the 
interpretation or application of the ECHR.115 The request should stem from a pending case 
before that court,116 and the opinion of the Strasbourg Court will not be binding.117 The 
provisions of Protocol 16 have attracted considerable scholarly attention118 (also in light of the 
EU’s potential accession to the ECHR, a point briefly considered below). Domestic courts do 
interpret, of course, the Convention,119 and therefore it is anticipated that the activation of 
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Protocol 16 will incite at least some domestic courts to submit questions to the ECtHR 
concerning primarily the margin of appreciation, but complementarily the notion of European 
consensus as well.  
Beyond this, Protocol 16 ECHR will have implications for the EU’s accession to the ECHR, if 
and when it takes place. One of the reasons put forward by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) in its controversial Opinion 2/2013120 that the Draft Agreement on the EU 
accession to the ECHR121 was incompatible with the autonomy of EU law was that the advisory 
opinion process via Protocol 16 could circumvent the preliminary reference procedure under 
Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).122 Regardless of 
the merits of this finding by the CJEU, for present purposes the following hypothetical scenario 
may be reflected upon: the domestic court requests an advisory opinion from Strasbourg on a 
matter which falls under the scope of EU law, and involves the interpretation of Convention 
rights or indeed Charter rights which correspond to those guaranteed by the Convention.123 The 
CJEU judgment in Delvigne124 already provides a suitable example for reflection. To what 
extent the CJEU’s indications may correspond to the ECtHR’s permissible margin of 
appreciation under Hirst (No 2) is something that the Strasbourg Court could be called upon to 
decide.125 And indeed, the ECtHR is frequently exploring the case-law of the CJEU also in 
cases where it resorts to European consensus. While the existing interactions between the two 
European courts no doubt constitute a fascinating topic to explore,126 it cannot be excluded that 
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post-accession Protocol 16 ECHR effectively will bring to the fore possible discrepancies 
between the EU and the ECHR standards of protection. All this is to suggest that clarifying the 
relationship between the margin of appreciation and consensus post-Protocol 16 will improve 
the coherence of the ECtHR’s reasoning in its interactions with the CJEU - whichever form 
such interaction may take after a hypothetical accession agreement.  
Lastly, the discussion on the Convention and the Court’s reform is ongoing as the recent 
Copenhagen Declaration (which welcomed the entry into force of Protocol 16 and urged the 
few remaining states to ratify Protocol 15127) demonstrated. Although some of the controversial 
and, indeed, unfortunate formulations128 of an earlier draft Declaration were omitted or 
redrafted in the final text, the fact remains that several states have been insisting that the Court 
should rely more extensively on the notions of subsidiarity (perhaps advancing a ‘state centric 
subsidiarity’129) and the margin of appreciation.  
Once the Court’s general approach with regard to consensus and the margin of appreciation 
has been presented, it is now appropriate to examine the legitimacy question.  
The relationship between European consensus and the margin of appreciation in light of 
the multi-dimensional legitimacy of the Strasbourg Court 
Why this relationship is linked with the legitimacy question 
At least three reasons can be provided as to why the Court’s approach with regard to the 
interplay between the two notions is linked to the ongoing discussion on the ECtHR’s 
legitimacy. First, the methodology of international courts and tribunals contributes to the 
legitimisation of their judgments; this may also be termed as ‘procedural fairness’.130 The 
clearer the methodology, the more likely applicants will trust the Court’s reasoning, and the 
more likely respondent states will implement the Court’s judgments. Second, on the use of 
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consensus as such, a question arises as to whether it is appropriate for a counter-majoritarian 
institution to resort to consensus (which involves a ‘majoritarian dimension’) in order to 
adjudicate on the permissible margin of appreciation. Third, the scope of the use of the margin 
of appreciation by the ECtHR (which as we have seen is frequently, but not always, influenced 
by consensus) is relevant as that doctrine sometimes acts as a safeguard against judicial 
activism.131  
Preliminary remarks about the legitimacy of international courts and tribunals 
Judges sitting at international courts or tribunals are generally not elected; their legitimacy,132 
therefore, cannot stem from the regular domestic electoral process. As a parenthetical 
observation, it is noted that the same generally holds for national judges (with some exceptions, 
such as judges in several US states), and therefore there is nothing particularly extraordinary 
about this situation. Regardless, state consent cannot but constitute the starting point when 
searching for legitimacy.133 However, it is generally accepted that because of their influence 
(international courts do not simply affect the litigants in a specific case, but ‘shape the 
obligations of states prospectively’, while impacting non-state actors as well), the ‘normative 
legitimacy’ of such courts should be further substantiated.134 Accordingly, given that 
international courts perform functions which go beyond dispute settlement (namely they 
‘stabilize normative expectations’, ‘develop normative expectations and thus make law’ and 
‘control and legitimate the authority exercised by others’), state consent has to be 
complemented with ‘other legitimatory resources’.135 The emergence of human rights norms 
at the regional or international level evidence the transformation of traditional understandings 
of sovereignty, if not the challenges that domestic orders face in order to provide solutions to 
persistent, yet interdependent, problems. In this sense, Alter rightly points out that international 
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courts ‘can contribute to accountability in domestic and international politics, which is part of 
the project of making international law democratically legitimate’.136 Adding to this perhaps, 
Donald and Leach observe that a ‘widely acknowledged justification for international human 
rights bodies is the need to provide an external safety mechanism given the inevitability that 
even well-functioning democracies make mistakes’; thus, ‘judicial review provides an external 
corrective to, rather than a substitute for, domestic deliberation’.137 That being said, if 
international courts are viewed as ‘policy instruments’, then it is easier to explain the fact that 
courts do depend on social legitimacy for implementation: ‘non-compliance with the law is 
certainly not the goal, but it can be a way to allow for democratic choice to trump international 
law compliance’.138 Thus, on the one hand, the legitimacy of international human rights courts 
vis-à-vis the people also resides in their power to generate a ‘generalizable interest’ on the basis 
of a specific case; potentially, their judgments could ‘protect individuals everywhere and in 
any part of the world’.139 On the other, ‘the absence of directly representative institutions on 
the transnational level and the difficulty of establishing a meaningful electoral process on the 
global level is one of the reasons why the principle of subsidiarity has greater weight when 
assessing institutional decision-making beyond the state’.140 
For international courts, legitimacy becomes more challenging inter alia since their judges ‘are  
less  subject  to  peer  pressure  and  less  steeped  in  a domestic judicial culture’, ‘and also 
because [a]buse of judicial power is more likely when legislation is more indeterminate’ – as 
it can be with an international treaty.141 Simultaneously, international courts perform two 
functions closely associated with the rule of law, a ‘central standard of legitimacy’: they 
‘enhance non-domination by guarantees and protections of individuals against infringements 
by their state’, and they ‘increase predictability’, which enables individuals ‘to make longer 
term plans in pursuit of [their] various interests’.142 
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How the broader use of consensus by the Strasbourg Court supports its multi-dimensional 
legitimacy 
Much of what was said about the legitimacy of the international courts and tribunals also 
applies to the Strasbourg Court. However, owing to the Convention’s particular features, 
including the right of individual application, the procedure of appointment of the ECtHR’s 
judges, the Court’s method of adjudication, and subsidiarity as manifested in the Convention, 
it is necessary to examine the legitimacy of the ECtHR separately. From earlier sections it 
follows that even if the presence or lack of consensus may overlap with the Court’s decision 
on the margin of appreciation, this by no means entails that consensus was in all of these cases 
the decisive factor upon which the Court based its decision. This can be explained if European 
consensus is examined in light of the legitimacy of the Strasbourg Court. 
Is European consensus the safest method to adjudicate on borderline cases? Or should it be 
rejected altogether when the ECtHR decides when the respondent should be granted the margin 
of appreciation? The author does not believe that consensus is the only legitimising factor that 
should determine the outcome of new, unsettled human rights questions. As such, consensus is 
neither irrelevant nor the only factor to be considered by the Strasbourg Court. It is submitted 
that the answer as to why European consensus is generally being used in the aforementioned 
way is because the legitimacy of the ECtHR is multi-dimensional (a point explained in a 
moment), and therefore the Court cannot but deviate occasionally from the guidance provided 
by the comparative exercise, whilst simultaneously taking it into due consideration.  
Although answering the enquiry as to when European consensus should be used or followed by 
the ECtHR falls outside the scope of this paper, it is nonetheless important to note that the 
ECtHR is by definition a counter-majoritarian institution; thus, seeking guidance via the 
identification of a strong majority across the contracting parties does not always constitute a 
helpful exercise.143 Accordingly, the ECtHR’s legitimacy cannot be solely dependent on a 
comparative exercise across 47 states. Simultaneously, however, it is generally accepted that 
the Strasbourg Court ensures a minimum level of protection (this being an expression of the 
subsidiarity principle) and thus ‘institutional reasons’ suggest that the ECtHR will inevitably 
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be, in some cases, deferential.144 Thus, when deciding on the margin of appreciation, consensus 
offers gains in objectivity, predictability and perhaps occasionally transparency,145 which 
cannot be neglected. The simultaneous counter-majoritarian and subsidiary function of the 
ECtHR is returned to below. 
Let us now explore the multi-dimensional legitimacy of the ECtHR. The Court’s powers stem 
from an international treaty signed by the democratic will of states (pacta sunt servanda).146 
That treaty grants the Court under Article 19 ECHR the mandate to ‘ensure the observance of 
the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the 
Protocols thereto’. Moreover, the first paragraph of Article 32 ECHR states that ‘[t]he 
jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and application 
of the Convention and the Protocols thereto’, while the second that ‘in the event of dispute as 
to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide’. Next, the Strasbourg Court (and, 
indeed, any court) fulfills its functions when it is completely independent. Thus, Protocol 14 
ECHR, which introduced a nine year non-renewable term for judges, certainly enhances the 
legitimacy of the ECtHR.147 Particularly important is the right of individual application to the 
Court, which goes hand-in-hand with the Court’s legitimacy.148 Further, the quality of the 
Court’s reasoning augments the legitimacy of its judgments: in principle, a thoroughly 
explained decision adds to the coherence and predictability of the Convention machinery, 
thereby contributing to legal certainty.149 Differently put, ‘procedural fairness’ legitimises the 
outcome of the Court’s judgments.150 It has rightly been observed, though, that ‘the style of 
reasoning adopted by the Court places the flexibility needed to deal with cases on their facts 
above the achievement of doctrinal clarity or engagement with the philosophical issues at 
stake’.151 
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A study completed in 2011 found that various domestic actors perceive the Court as legitimate, 
primarily due to its function to guarantee the respect for human rights even at the expense of 
unpopularity or opposition from domestic governments.152 The Court’s popularity with civil 
society – despite the limited number of admissible cases submitted by NGOs – may be 
explained with reference to the persistent ‘exemplary’ relationship between the Strasbourg 
Court and NGOs; the latter view access to the Court as an ‘opportunity to participate in the 
development of international human rights law’.153 Further, the fact that judges are elected by 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, on the basis of three nominees,154 adds 
to the Court’s legitimacy. Importantly, the legitimacy of the ECtHR was enhanced by the 
decision of the Parliamentary Assembly not to accept lists of candidates if they do not include 
at least one candidate of each sex, with a view to ensuring a fairer gender balance on the 
bench.155  
When considering the Strasbourg Court’s legitimacy, comparisons with directly elected 
legislatures at the domestic level beg the question as to whether it is the role of courts (be they 
domestic or inter/supranational) to function as majoritarian institutions. According to a 
particular strand of political constitutionalism, however, precisely on these grounds 
international human rights courts should be confined to ‘weak review’.156 
The other side of the coin with regard to the ECtHR’s legitimacy is subsidiarity, which means 
here that the Court cannot be deemed to enjoy limitless legitimacy, however firm its social 
acceptance may be found to be. The Court has never been truly hostile to subsidiarity,157 
precisely because it is completely impractical for the Court (or the Committee of Ministers) to 
ensure compliance without the cooperation of the domestic authorities, either at the preventive 
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stage or during enforcement. Subsidiarity also entails that the Court will frequently point out 
that the domestic authorities are in a better position to assess the relevant human right question 
– and therefore the appropriate standard of protection. After all, the Convention safeguards 
minimum standards; a dynamic interpretation of the ECHR, especially when far-reaching, 
almost always entails a risk of allegations of judicial activism.  
In this context, the ECtHR has to strike a delicate balance between its constitutionalist mission 
(enshrined by Articles 19 and 32 ECHR) and its subsidiary role in guaranteeing the appropriate 
standards of protection. The challenging position of a Court which acts as the jurisdiction of 
last resort is this: it has to develop the standards of human rights according to the evolutive 
interpretation of the treaties, but not to the point of – for example – creating new rights which 
do not feature or cannot be inferred from the Convention’s text or purpose. After all, 
transnational institutions (including courts) cannot rely on the ‘presumption of legitimacy’ that 
national institutions enjoy.158 This is why the importance of the right to individual application 
to the Strasbourg Court should be reiterated, a right which cannot, of course, in itself, legitimise 
any Court judgment. Moreover, the traditions (or vigour) of judicial review across Europe 
vary,159 and this perhaps could explain why some of the voices accusing the Court of activism 
stem from domestic judicial branches.  
Such a balance (between the constitutionalist function and subsidiarity) is no doubt anything 
but a straightforward exercise, and this is where European consensus may come into play. 
European consensus adds as well to the legitimacy of the Court’s conclusions. However, if 
European consensus always had to be accepted as the crucial factor to be taken into 
consideration by the Strasbourg Court, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that there would be 
no need to establish a Court in the first place (or at least to grant it the present jurisdiction under 
Articles 19 and 32 ECHR). It would probably suffice to establish an independent monitoring 
mechanism attached to the Council of Europe, which would merely identify and then confirm 
the convergence of the various legal orders in Europe on sensitive matters, and then would 
adjust (possibly through a process of ratification) the level of human rights protection 
accordingly. This is to suggest that the Court has to interpret and apply the Convention. In so 
doing, it cannot merely be satisfied with the outcome of a comparative research across the 
contracting parties – and this can work both ways, that is, either in favour or to the detriment 
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of the development of human rights standards. In this sense, when consensus is not the catalyst 
for the decision on the margin of appreciation, it cannot be taken for granted that the Court’s 
judgments lack legitimacy simply because the Court did not follow or give prominence to the 
guidance provided by European consensus.   
To be sure, the work of the Court may be criticised from a broader standpoint, which obviously 
exceeds the Convention’s ‘territory’. Reservations have been and will continue to be raised 
about the Court’s judgments due to a plethora of reasons, including varying degrees of 
skepticism vis-à-vis judicial review,160 especially when it enforces rights which are not 
‘narrowly defined or absolute’.161 It has been observed that ‘rights adjudication is intrinsically 
political’;162 authors have critiqued, from various standpoints, the theory of ‘common law 
constitutionalism’.163 Criticism has been levelled against the judiciary for failure to protect civil 
liberties and restrict the power of the executive, even after the adoption of landmark pieces of 
legislation such as the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998.164 Other approaches understand 
developments such as the Human Rights Act165 as a successful compromise of a seemingly 
‘impossible demand’: the need to reconcile ‘the demands of self-rule with the need to respect 
the human rights of those within its remit’.166 The Act may therefore facilitate the dialogue 
between the legislature and the judiciary.167 These points should be duly noted in an account 
discussing the legitimacy of courts and tribunals, but it is, of course, beyond the aims of this 
contribution to address the perennial debate on the merit (or lack thereof) of judicial review, or 
– more generally - the relationship between the judiciary and the elected legislature. 
In some cases, criticism against the Strasbourg Court and the Convention (particularly from 
non-academic circles) may possibly stem from an ‘antipathy’ towards European control over 
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domestic affairs,168 and such criticism directed at the ECtHR may occasionally be voiced via 
the ‘convenience’ of the legitimacy discourse. It may also be assumed that the simultaneous 
presence of two European courts conflates these voices of concern.169 Yet it could equally be 
claimed that a ‘virtuous competition’ between the two courts may result in ‘beneficial effects 
for the protection of fundamental rights in Europe’.170  
In any event, while the author does not stand among those believing that the ECtHR has been, 
on balance, particularly activist in its approach, the author acknowledges, nonetheless, that the 
discussion on legitimacy cannot be overlooked by the Strasbourg judges, not least because of 
the imminent risk of non-implementation. Because of the structure of the Convention 
machinery as a subsidiary level of protection, effective implementation – although formally 
entrusted to the Committee of Ministers171 – quite inevitably presupposes dialogue172 and 
‘communication between the different actors’.173  
Thus, to return to the question of the use of European consensus by the Strasbourg Court, it is 
submitted that using consensus as one of the available forms of reasoning within 
proportionality is preferable to either disregarding consensus altogether or relying primarily 
(or perhaps exclusively) on it, because this supports the multi-dimensional legitimacy of a 
Court that has to strike a delicate balance between the development of human rights in Europe 
(the constitutionalist thesis) and its role as the jurisdiction of last resort. Consensus injects a 
majoritarian dimension to the Court’s analysis which can seem at first glance attractive from a 
legitimacy point of view. It is not clear, however, why priority should be given to this 
legitimising factor. Thus, the lack of consensus cannot amount to a ‘carte blanche’ for 
violations of rights as such matters are ultimately determined by a Strasbourg Court duly 
considering present-day conditions and evolution. The presence of consensus should also not 
exclude the possibility for the respondent to justify divergence (in light of subsidiarity). The 
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Court was not created to decide on a consensual basis; it was created to safeguard and, where 
appropriate, develop the human rights standards in Europe, being mindful, nonetheless, of its 
subsidiary role and the need to defer in order to accommodate domestic sensitivities or 
expertise - again, where appropriate.  
In this sense, the application of consensus within the proportionality exercise enables the Court 
to take into account a plethora of factors before concluding on the margin of appreciation, such 
as the balancing of competing public and private interests, the examination of less restrictive 
alternatives, considerations of whether the essence of the right has been impaired, the tenet that 
rights should be practical and effective and not theoretical and illusory, occasionally statistical 
evidence or expert opinions,174 among others.  
Taking this further, unless we accept that courts are majoritarian institutions (they are not) or 
at least that they reflect majoritarian tendencies (even prominent sceptics of judicial review 
would not advance the claim that such review, when it occurs or should occur and however 
confined, should be ultimately based on a calculus of the majority view), then the majoritarian 
aspect of consensus is not the best argument to legitimise its use by the Court. Rather, it is the 
actual convergence of the legal orders that enables the Court to resort to evolutive 
interpretation; and it is that convergence that should be viewed as legitimising consensus. 
Evolutive interpretation, it is remembered, is based on the tenet that the Convention is a living 
instrument which should reflect present-day conditions. If consensus is the bridge between the 
margin of appreciation and evolutive interpretation,175 then the convergence across Europe can 
be deemed to reflect the necessary present-day conditions, thereby justifying the use of 
consensus. Thus, it is crucial for the Court, or so this article submits, to disentangle consensus 
perhaps not primarily from the margin of appreciation, as Rozakis argued,176 but from its 
majoritarian component. Often, one finds in the Court’s reasoning meticulous calculations of 
the position across the Council of Europe, rather than elaboration on the nature and scope of 
convergence. The argument can be put in a different way: the Court should disentangle the 
majoritarian dimension of consensus from the application of the margin of appreciation. There 
is an additional reason for this: if the precise function of consensus is not made clear, then 
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ultimately the faculty for the Court to rely on evolutive interpretation on the basis of other 
criteria as well may be lost.  
Overall, consensus as a form of analysis, however useful, has its limitations. In this context, 
the Court should clearly articulate in its jurisprudence its general approach concerning the 
impact of consensus on the margin of appreciation. The concluding section will show, 
nonetheless, that this is not the case. Thus, while the article has generally justified the ECtHR’s 
general approach from the point of view of its compatibility with the multi-dimensional 
legitimacy of the Court, it will take a slightly more critical approach when it comes to the 
coherence in the ECtHR’s reasoning.  
Conclusion and outlook: A call for a clearer articulation of the relationship between the 
two terms 
This article sought to clarify the relationship between the margin of appreciation doctrine and 
European consensus. It was shown that consensus does not always determine the outcome on 
the margin of appreciation. Consensus is a form of reasoning used by the Court in its 
application of the proportionality test. Moreover, it was demonstrated that the clarification of 
the interplay between the two notions will have implications for the interpretation of the 
Convention after the entry into force of Protocols 15 and 16 ECHR.  
In this context, this contribution argued that the use of consensus by the ECtHR as an important, 
yet flexible, exercise supports its multi-dimensional legitimacy. Indeed, the general use of 
consensus by the ECtHR in the determination of the margin of appreciation fits into the 
function of the Court as a non-majoritarian European institution, benefitting from different 
sources of legitimacy, which does, nonetheless, operate under the principle of subsidiarity and 
the related need to accommodate diversity across Europe. It is true that the deployment of 
European consensus often enhances the legitimacy of the ECtHR’s judgments. But total 
reliance on it by the Strasbourg Court would undermine the latter’s constitutionalist position 
or the legitimacy it enjoys owing to a number of other factors, including individuals’ direct 
access to that Court. 
The paper examined a number of cases where a mismatch between consensus and the margin 
of appreciation was identified, and referred to several further judgments where the outcome on 
the margin of appreciation did not deviate from the guidance provided by the comparative 
exercise - even though in the latter case consensus was not always the crucial element that 
guided the Court. To be sure, the aim was to unravel the general approach of the Court insofar 
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as the interplay between these two terms is concerned; it should not be concluded that the 
outcome or legitimacy of the Court’s balancing exercise in some or all of the above cases was 
assessed here: this was not a contribution on the application of proportionality by the ECtHR, 
nor was it assessed when exactly consensus should inform the margin of appreciation.   
Of course, the question of when European consensus should be used by the Court and, if so, 
when it should determine the outcome on the margin of appreciation, is critical to 
understanding whether use (or non-use) of consensus analysis contributes to the legitimacy of 
the Court. This is certainly a valid point, in response to which the following remarks can be of 
relevance. In order to answer the question of how much weight consensus should play in the 
Court’s reasoning, it is essential to critically reflect on all forms of reasoning adopted by the 
Court, with a view to evaluating their significance. That exercise goes beyond the aims of this 
contribution – albeit it is noted that there would be considerable challenges in such exercise, 
not least because often much depends on the factual and legal framework of each case. In any 
event, the how precedes the when: to answer the latter question, one should first dispel any 
doubts as to the current method employed by the Strasbourg Court. Thus, the present article 
can serve as a basis for further research on the ways of reasoning employed by the Court, 
including consensus. 
Beyond the contribution to the legitimacy debate, the findings of this article have a number of 
implications for respondent states, applicants, or even critics of the ECtHR. States and 
individuals should be aware that invoking the consensus argument does not automatically lead 
to more or less deferential judgments. Of course, pondering on whether they have gone far 
enough or too far is an exercise that international courts cannot escape  – but this cannot solely 
depend on the consensus question, however helpful a method it may be found to be. In any 
event, the judges in Strasbourg are mindful of, if not concerned about, the present legitimacy 
debate – but it is useful to remember that opposition to/ criticism of the Court is not necessarily 
evidence of illegitimate judgments: 
‘If there were neat harmony of interests between national legislatures and international 
human rights courts, or between minority protection and majoritarian popular 
sovereignty, or between individual citizens and the authorities governing over them, we 
would hardly need international human rights treaties in the first place’.177 
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As already noted, though, the article will conclude with some critical observations. The 
following question can be posed: what is the way forward for the ECtHR, in light of the broader 
discussion on the Court’s legitimacy (which includes clarity of reasoning, as already 
explained), and most notably the adoption of Protocols 15 and 16 ECHR, which will inevitably 
bring to the fore issues addressed here? This contribution will encourage the Court to articulate 
its approach on the relationship between consensus and the margin of appreciation in a more 
accessible and coherent way; in other words, it is now time for consolidation and codification.  
Indeed, a number of cases illustrate that the Court has used different formulations in its 
jurisprudence. In several judgments concerning Article 8 ECHR, the Court has delineated this 
relationship as follows: 
‘A number of factors must be taken into account when determining the breadth of the 
margin of appreciation to be enjoyed by the State in any case under Article 8. Where a 
particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, the margin 
allowed to the State will be restricted. … Where, however, there is no consensus within 
the member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the 
interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it, particularly where the case raises 
sensitive moral or ethical issues, the margin will be wider’.178 
This definition is incomplete: first, the question as to whether and to what extent the presence 
of consensus is relevant for the margin of appreciation is not addressed; second, there has been 
jurisprudence where the Court granted the margin in cases where a particularly important facet 
of the individual’s existence or identity was at stake.  
In cases involving Article 14 (in conjunction with other Convention articles, and notably 
Article 8), the Strasbourg Court has employed the following explanation:  
‘[t]he scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the 
subject-matter and its background; in this respect, one of the relevant factors may be the 
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existence or non-existence of common ground between the laws of the Contracting 
States’.179 
The same formulation has also been used in the context of Article 3 of Protocol 1 ECHR.180 
Using slightly different wording, the Court observed in a case concerning the alleged violation 
of Article 14, in conjunction with Article 5 ECHR that ‘[a]n additional factor relevant for 
determining the extent to which the respondent State should be afforded a margin of 
appreciation is the existence or non-existence of a European consensus’.181 These definitions 
are better, in that they address the existence of consensus as well. However, they may be taken 
to mean that the Court in most cases resorts to the comparative material, which is not the case. 
Also, they do not encompass cases where consensus and the margin of appreciation do not 
overlap. 
On a few occasions where Article 9 was at stake, the ECtHR held that it ‘may, if appropriate, 
have regard to any consensus and common values emerging from the practices of the States 
Parties to the Convention’.182 They key difference is the term ‘if appropriate’, which is more 
reflective of the Court’s existing practice. However, there is no reference to the absence of 
consensus. 
In this context, the article concludes by arguing that the Court should clarify and consolidate 
its messages with regard to the interplay between the two notions. This contribution has offered 
insights into the Court’s general practice.183 A more coherent approach will also assist the 
parties (or interveners) when preparing their submissions, and will alleviate some of the 
inconsistency in the Court’s reasoning.  
 
179
 Rasmussen v Denmark (n 100) para 40. See also Glor v Switzerland, Application 13444/04, 30 April 2009, 
para 75; and Petrovic v Austria (n 85) para 38, concerning Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR. 
180
 Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v Greece (Grand Chamber) (n 33) para 66. 
181
 Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v Russia (n 85) para 79. 
182
 Hamidović v Bosnia and Herzegovina (n 95) para 38; S.A.S. v France (n 95) para 129.  
183
 For example, a definition along the following lines can be proposed: in order to decide whether states should 
be granted the margin of appreciation, one of the factors that the Court may take into consideration, where 
appropriate, is the presence or lack of consensus. The presence or absence of consensus is often, but not always, 
influential in the decision on the margin of appreciation. 
